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ABSTRACT  
 
The problem of the selfhas recently regained a wide interest in the philosophical panorama. The 
need to rethink the agent has then encouraged the rediscovery of Ancient Philosophy. Focusing 
on Aristotelian practical philosophy, this paper aims to demonstrate the intrinsic circularity 
existing between the agent and his context. To give evidence of this theory, it will be necessary 
to investigate the extensive concept of ethos, the meanings of which embrace both individual 
and collective dimension. Moreover, this itinerary through the Aristotelian thought will be the 
occasion for putting the rebirth of interest towards Ancient Philosophy into question. 
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Introduction 
“b” 
In the last decades the contemporary ethical scenario, especially in analytic 
philosophy, has renewed the debate about the self and the agency. The shared 
dissatisfaction towards the ethical perspectives, as P. Donatelli observes1, has led 
to the rediscovery and examination of the overshadowed dimension of the moral 
agent. 
In this discussion, the Aristotelian voice has been raised by many scholars 
(belonging mainly to the Virtue Ethics current), who have identified the Greek 
philosopher as a relevant source for rethinking the moral agent and for putting 
the coordinates of contemporary moral philosophy into question. Given this 
premise and background, the paper will develop the research hypothesis that to 
fully understand the moral agent we have to consider him as deeply linked to his 
context. In order to throw some light on this issue, the essay will engage the 
cardinal concept of ethos2 in the Aristotelian practical philosophy. In particular, it 
                                                          
1 Donatelli P., Il senso della virtù, Carocci, Roma, 2009. 
2 In this essay I will follow some simple and coherent rules for the transliteration from Greek to 
English. I will not be taking into account the differences between the vocals, such as epsilon and 
eta or omicron and omega; the two vocals’ couple will be transliterated with “e”, in the first case, 
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will attempt to analyze the relationship between its two essential meanings: 
individual ethos and collective ethos. While the first one states the agent’s character, 
the second one indicates the context, referring to shared values, habits and 
tradition. Collective ethos will then be named directly polis or context in the 
development of the paper, due to the plurality of the connotations involved.  
However, if the general aim is to determine the relationship between the two 
meanings of ethos, then the specific themes of the paper are two crossed subsets. 
The first aims to show how for Aristotle moral agent and polis are conceivable as 
poles existing only in their relationship. Whereas, the second sought subset wants 
to prove whether this approach is effective in front of some specific contemporary 
practical challenges. The intersection between these two parts is played by a 
transitional passage that shows the reasons for the rebirth of the Aristotelian 
praxis in the contemporary scenario. Coherently with its purpose, the paper is 
organized into three main sections: (1) the reconstruction of contemporary ethical 
demands; (2) the Aristotelian answer to the relationship between the part and the 
whole and (3) the test of its legitimacy and limits regarding contemporary ethical 
experience.  
Therefore, (1) the first part of the paper will focus on the contemporary ethical 
debate, by giving an account of what kind of contemporaneity is thought and why it 
has been chosen. In fact, due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the 
philosophical panorama, as previously mentioned the boundaries of the discussion 
will be circumscribed to a specific movement in the analytic philosophy, notably 
Virtue Ethics, and to some of its actors (such as A. Anscombe, A. MacIntyre, M. 
Slote). Thus, to satisfy this preliminary passage, it will be necessary to interrogate 
the reasons of Virtue Ethics and the main steps of the rediscovery of Aristotelian 
practical philosophy in this scenario. 
Following the research project, (2) the second part will be shaped on the 
concept of ethos as it emerges in Aristotle’s practical writings. As a matter of fact, 
its characteristic plurivocity is the key lecture for showing the circularity between 
individual ethos and the collective one. This draws the attention to two cornerstone 
ideas: (a) the character preformation and (b) the practical agent’s active 
contribution. In order to elucidate them, it will be necessary to study the problem 
of the character education by looking at the concept of virtue. First, I will briefly 
introduce (a) the passive phase, by showing how the polis influences the individual 
character. Thanks to the concepts of induced virtue it will be possible to emphasize 
the process of metabolization of habits and values. Thereafter, I will demonstrate 
how Aristotle conceives (b) the way an agent may modify or influence his context. 
Indeed, although Aristotle believes in the priority of the context/polis, he does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
and “o”, in the second one. Moreover, the Greek vocal “u” will be transliterated with “y” (e.g. 
physis). 
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suppress a certain level of freedom for the agent. In this case, it will be necessary 
to examine the two meanings of practical reason in depth: the phronetical and the 
philosophical one. This will lead to the possible conclusion that the circularity 
between the individual ethos and the collective one cannot be defined as vicious, 
despite many scholars doing so. 
To conclude, (3) the essay will focus on the pertinence of the Aristotelian 
perspective in the contemporary debate. Due to this goal, the conclusive part will 
problematize one issue: the impasse of collective ethos. The purpose will be to verify 
whether at present the concept of collective ethos has become too reductive or 
whether it is still functional. In other words, the attempt will be to understand 
whether the collective ethos still offers interpretative tools to approach the ethical 
experience and, if it does not, it will be necessary to explain why. In this case, the 
core issue will be to understand if we are bearing witness to an explosion of forms 
of life, that is to say to a pluralization of the contexts involved in our experience. 
However, as mentioned, it is necessary to begin with the reconstruction of the 
contemporary philosophical background.  
 
 
1. The necessity of  a new approach and the rebirth of  Aristotelian practical philosophy 
 
As the introductory title anticipates, this chapter aims at reconstructing a 
particular horizon incontemporary philosophy, Virtue Ethics, where Aristotelian 
practical philosophy has been the object of study and served as a model. This 
statement immediately raises difficulties, because it does not reckon with the 
many different trajectories that cross Virtue Ethics. In effect, when we talk of this 
movement, we are easily tempted to read it as if it were strictly coherent and 
rigorous. Contrarily, all the philosophers3 who took part in it have developed some 
essential peculiarities and they would deserve a specific analysis. Some of them 
have probably distanced their ideas so far from that they can no longer be 
assimilated. However, even if it is impossible (and most likely not even necessary 
for our purpose) to abridge all of them in a single scenario, it is unobjectionable 
that there are some relevant early agreements. In fact, although their thoughts 
have been described as described heterogeneous and irreducible parabolas to each 
other, they have primarily moved from some considerable affinities. My present 
goal will be to investigate them and their reasons. 
To begin with, I would like to retrace the theoretical milieu that has 
encouraged the actualization of Aristotelian thought and of its cross concepts. The 
best way in order to do that is to understand its starting point. The analysis of 
two philosophers will support me in this operation: E. G. Anscombe and M. Slote. 
                                                          
3 I am thinking mostly of  MacIntyre A., Murdoch I., Anscombe G. E., Annas J. and Slote M.  
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Thanks to them, it will be possible to fully examine the ethical demand at the 
heart of the Aristotelian rebirth. By reading the Anscombe’s text, Modern Moral 
Philosophy, and Slote’s contribution, Virtue Ethics, we realize (a) that these 
authors raised their voices because of their dissatisfaction with contemporary 
moral philosophy and (b) that in Aristotle they found their favorite interlocutor 
because his philosophy offers a reliable alternative approach. 
 Let us start by taking a look at the analysis of the dissatisfaction with the way 
moral philosophy has been done in modern times and, especially, recently4 made by 
Slote. In particular, Slote’s claim is that the contemporary panorama is connoted 
by the struggle between two main ethical theories, on the one hand Kantian ethics 
or deontology and on the other Utilitarianism or Consequentialism. Slote remarks 
that neither of these approaches can give reason of the complexity of the ethical 
experience. As a consequence, according to Slote this shared unfitness legitimizes 
the assimilation of the two and, at the same time, promotes the revival of interest 
in ancient practical philosophy. Hence, the landscape of ethical debate has 
become re-articulated from two ways of thinking to three: Consequentialism and 
Kantian ethics, joined together, and Virtue Ethics, whose roots are generally in 
ancient philosophy and, especially, in Aristotle.  
 But Slote’s work also offers us a deeper key to understanding the 
interpretative battlefield, by explaining why Consequentialism and Kantian’s 
dyad are not able to completely satisfy the necessity of thinking the praxis. The 
reason lies in the dominant property that characterizes them: they are act-
focused, in the manner that they look for moral rules that are supposed to govern 
human actions5. According to Slote, this polarization of the action swallows up a 
fundamental part of morality, the one regarding the self and the moral agent. 
Conversely, Virtue Ethics is actually qualified for being agent-focused, that is to 
say that the focus is on the virtuous individual and on those inner traits, dispositions, 
and motives that qualify him as being virtuous6. So, Virtue Ethics is born exactly 
because of the necessity of rethinking the importance of the self, of the agent and 
of his entire characteristics, in contrast with the abstraction and the focus on 
action of the normative theories7. 
 However, the distance between these two lines of thought is marked not only 
by their main-focuses (act or agent), but also by their different ways of settling in 
the reality. On the one side, the Kantian/Utilitaristic approach privileges 
impersonality and objectivity, thanks to the support of an abstract and general 
parameter (whether it is the duty or the advantage is not important). Indeed, 
with this external principle they can guarantee an efficient and reliable way of 
                                                          
4 Slote M., Virtue ethics, in Three methods of  ethics, Wiley-Blackwell, 1997, p. 175. 
5 Ivi, p. 178. 
6 Ivi, p. 177. 
7 Donatelli P., Il senso della virtù, Introduction.  
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handling the experience. On the other side, Virtue Ethics demands a contextual or 
internal point of view. In this sense, the main problem is not the search for a 
criterion, but the analysis of how the agent is basically shaped by his form of life 
in order to become good. Now, the Aristotelian reference also becomes much 
clearer. As we will soon widely analyze, in Aristotelian practical philosophy, the 
character development necessarily takes place within the polis.  
To sum up, Slote’s principal contribution came in terms of a contraposition: 
the act-focus approach is grounded on an external point of view, while the agent-
focus approach is anchored on an internal one. Before continuing the analysis of 
the revival of practical philosophy it is important to bear in mind that the above-
seen contrast answers to the necessity of clarifying and that a “pure” approach 
does not exist. For example, imagining an absolute Kantian approach is useful in 
a descriptive perspective, but it is not realistic. In other words, it does not matter 
whether the focal center is the concept of duty, one of advantage or one of virtue: 
in the moral approach there is always an amalgam of different considerations 
working together.  
 Anyway, in these terms the importance of an internal point of view emerges 
for the first time with Anscombe. In her article, Modern Moral Philosophy, she 
denounces the stalemate of contemporary philosophy and she attacks 
contemporary normative philosophies. The reason of Anscombe’s account lies in 
their detachment from their background, where they were still valid. Talking 
about the contemporary approaches, she says that they are survivals, or derivatives 
from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics, which no longer generally survive, 
and are only harmful without it8. In this sense, the necessity of rethinking morality 
is born because of the disconnection between moral concepts and the consequent 
form of life, which concretely gives sense to them. Again, the answer is the 
rehabilitation of the Aristotelian conception of ethics and, in agreement with this 
different paradigm, the focus shifts from the duty and the action to the virtue and 
the agent’s character.  
 But, Anscombe’s analysis, based on the importance of the form of life, also 
highlights another latent root of Virtue Ethics: Wittgenstein and, especially, his 
late writing, Philosophical Investigations. This clarification reveals that the 
perception of dissatisfaction, which moves Virtue Ethics, is not a unicum and it is 
also shared with other authors, who find their roots in Wittgenstein’s works and 
in his fundamental idea of form of life9. If on the one side there are Anscombe, 
                                                          
8 Anscombe G.E.M., Modern Moral Philosophy, “Philosophy” XXXIII, 1958,pp. 1- 19, quote 
from p. 1. 
9 See Donatelli P. in Reshaping Ethics after Wittgenstein, in Wittgenstein-Studien, Band 4/2013: 
“I’d like to mention here the views held by authors such as Anscombe, Murdoch, Cavell and 
Diamond. They criticize, in very different ways, a significant line in modern and contemporary 
moral philosophy, which has depicted moral thought as the operation of  a few concepts cut off  
from the life form where they have place”, p. 224. Moreover, see Donatelli P. in the introduction 
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MacIntyre and other philosophers, who belong to Virtue Ethics and look at 
Aristotle as a model, then on the other there are some, such as S. Cavell and C. 
Diamond, who present themselves as a reliable alternative to Virtue Ethics. 
Although they share the same need to rethink ethics (and, above all the category 
of the self) beyond the limits of the moral ought conception and they do it by 
moving from the same claim of the form of life, the similar aim is pursued from 
different perspectives. In fact, the shared importance of the conceptual context as 
backdrop of moral life leaves room to a considerable distance, caused by the idea 
of “constitutive nature”. According to Anscombe’s account, virtues have to be 
inferred through the discovery of “natural” characteristics, that define what is 
truly human. This renewed naturalistic hypothesis supports then the assumption 
that the moral concepts of the Virtue Ethics are still valid, since they are stably 
based on human nature, while the morality of ought is temporarily attached to a 
particular form of life. The reference to a constitutive human nature is also the 
reason why Anscombe looks for a paradigm in ancient philosophy (e.g. in 
Aristotelian Practical Philosophy10), while Diamond and Cavell refute this option. 
Indeed, they have attempted to overcome the boundaries of a morality reduced to 
the ought not by referring to some proper human functions, but by focusing on the 
historical and dynamic density of moral concepts.  
 As a result, given this general framework, the real problem is not whether 
moral philosophy should be rethought or not, but how to perform this operation, 
in what direction and with which basis. It is for this reason that testing the 
efficacy of Virtue Ethics becomes even more important as well as remembering 
that the same philosophical necessity and root have produced at least two 
alternatives.  
 To recall the cardinal points, Virtue Ethics is a moral approach that can be 
interpreted as a laboratory for rethinking the praxis and it is qualified by two 
traits, inherited from the Aristotelian perspective and integrated with some 
contemporary philosophy contributions: (1) the problem of the self and of the 
virtuous character and (2) the inalienable contextual dimension. These two 
elements are inextricably shaped together. So, what matters above all, even more 
than their single exams, is always their relationship.  
But now, after having rebuilt the contemporary philosophical scenario and 
having outlined the main features of Virtue Ethics, it is time to inquire directly 
practical philosophy and to analyze Aristotle’s account of the relationship 
between the agent and the context.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
to Diamond C., L’immaginazione e la vita morale, edited by Donatelli P., Carocci, Roma, 2006. 
However, the reconstruction of  this contemporary framework is actually far more complex, 
since it also includes also a third interpretive line, Williams B., not reducible to the here 
instituted contraposition. 
10 The issue of  what kind of  “naturalism” we can talk about in Aristotelian Practical 
Philosophy will be problematized in the following pages.  
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2. Aristotle and the different meanings of  ethos  
 
a. The character preformation: from the collective ethos to the individual one  
 
As stated above, the scope of this second section is the study of the 
interactions between the different meanings of ethos in Aristotle. The supposition 
is that through a path in practical philosophy their necessary co-implication will 
be demonstrated.  
 However, preliminarily it is essential to make some methodological remarks. 
In fact, though the main book reference is surely Nicomachean Ethics, if we 
consider Aristotelian practical philosophy as a prism whose faces show different 
perspective of the same figure, it becomes evident that we also have to include the 
analysis developed in other practical works, such as Eudemian Ethics andPolitics. 
As a matter of fact, all these works have a common theme, which is the praxis, or 
better the eu-praxia, approached from different points of view and priorities. 
Moreover, it is always because of the continuity of contents, that it is impossible 
to elude the centrality of another treatise, De Anima, whose topic is the cardinal 
concept of the soul (psyche). In fact, a proper study of the eudaimonistic goal 
needs to broaden the horizon to the Aristotelian psychology and also to the 
metaphysics, since they both provide the coordinates for the analysis11. Always 
following the figurative representation, we could imagine a Cartesian plane whose 
axes are respectively Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology and whose point of 
intersection coincides with the prism of practical philosophy with all its sides. 
Thanks to this synoptic perspective, it will become clear that when we talk about 
a single concept we are at the same time engaging all the connected concepts (e.g. 
the concept of ethos is necessarily linked with those of psyche, of physis, of polis and 
of phronesis). Every concept is completely integrated in a network, giving a 
meaning to it. This principle is essential because it will play the role of evaluative 
parameter in the last section of the paper, being aimed at testing the pertinence of 
this point of view in contemporary ethics. Indeed, the result of this coordination 
of concepts is that they only make sense when kept together, therefore they may 
                                                          
11 Irwin T. H. proceeds exactly in this direction, in The metaphysical and psychological basis of  
Aristotle’s ethics, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, edited by Rorty A. O., University of  California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980. Irwin wants to prove the point that sectorial and self-
sufficient interpretation of  the Aristotelian’s writings is unsatisfactory, while it is more 
productive to imagine them as intersections of  a more complex texture. Moreover, it is 
important to remind that Aristotelian psychology is far from an anthropological reduction, 
since the concept of  psyche embraces all the living things. About the metaphysical coordinates 
of  practical philosophy, the last Book is paradigmatic, the chapters from VI to VIII and the 
problem of  the “human condition”. 
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be unacceptable singularly. If there is a significant critical point of the present 
analysis, it is probably caused by this necessary co-implication of concepts.  
 But the above-outlined synoptic principle is the reason why if we want to 
engage in the issue of the reciprocal influences among the two ethos forms, we have 
to also address our interest to the virtue theory. This expression refers to the 
process of learning, training and practice of the political12 virtue. This clarification 
of the political dimension is necessary since Aristotle makes a distinction between 
the “natural” virtue (physike arete) and the virtue “in the full sense” (kyria)13. 
Following the philosopher’s remarks, we shall turn our attention to the second 
meaning, which from now on will simply be called virtue. The reason behind the 
minimization of the natural roots of the virtue is that Aristotle refuses to qualify 
his ethics as a simple form of naturalism14. That means that his ethical perspective 
does not imply a natural exercise of dynameis, capacities, but a canalization of 
them towards ton agathon (the good). Nevertheless, although the agent cannot be 
naturally moral, since ethics needs a detachment from simple naturalness, the 
interpretation of character as a “second nature” is sustainable. This is only one of 
the paradoxes of practical philosophy that will be dissolved in the next pages, like 
the one concerning the new form of automatism generated by the acquisition of 
this second nature. Barely outlined now, these themes will be widened below.  
                                                          
12 Here and in all the paper political will be used in an etymological sense; so, it is directly 
connected with the dimension of  the polis, not “simply” with the political horizon, as we are 
used to believe now.  
13 The unique definition of  character we have is in Eudemian Ethics, Inwood B. and Woolf  
Raphael (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2013 (Book II, 1220 b 1) and is imbalanced towards 
the natural virtue. However, in Nicomachean Ethics we witness an understatement of  the 
natural virtue importance and a strengthening of  habituation process. The reconstruction of  
the confutation of  the natural virtue inNicomachean Ethics and its reasons are exposed in La 
catena delle cause, determinismo e antideterminismo nel pensiero antico e contemporaneo, edited by 
Natali C. and Maso S., Hakkert, Amsterdam, 2005. Another fundamental reference is Abitudine 
e saggezza. Aristotele dall’Etica Eudemia all’Etica Nicomachea, Donini P., Edizioni dell’Orso, 
Alessandria, 2014. In this book Donini explains the differences between the Eudemian Ethics 
and the Nicomachean Ethics analyzing their chronology, and proving the anteriority of  the 
Eudemian,. In fact, while in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle emphasizes the natural foundation 
of  virtue, in the Nicomachean Ethics he focuses on the metabolization of  habits. Donini then 
retraces the cause of  this turn and of  this deeper analysis of  the habituation process on the 
influence played by Plato’s Laws on Aristotle. 
14 Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975, Book II, 1103 a 15 ff.: “an ethical virtue is acquired by 
habituation (ethos), as it indicated by the name ‘ethical’, which varies slightly from the name 
‘ethos’. From this fact it is also clear that none of  the ethical virtues arises in us by nature [at 
birth], for no thing which exists by nature can be changes into something else by habituation 
(…) Hence virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; but by our nature we 
can receive them and perfect them by habituation”. 
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 However, what exactly is the thread that connects the relationship between 
individual ethos and collective ethos with virtue in practical philosophy? To 
understand it, let me turn to the first cornerstone idea: the preformation of 
character or the habit-forming process. With these two equivalent expressions I 
mean the way collective ethos shape and educate the practical agent. This is 
synthesizable by the concept of induced virtue, which is functional to this analysis 
for two reasons: (a) it creates an initial hierarchy between the forms of ethos in 
favor of the collective one and (b) it demands us to give reasons on how the virtue is 
induced.  
 First, we assumed that from Aristotle’s account the polis is responsible for 
character habituation through paideia, education. This point of view is clearly 
supported by the continuity existing between Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. As 
it emerges from Nicomachen Ethics, Book I, the goal of politics is the highest good 
and politics takes the greatest care in making the citizens of a certain quality, i.e., good 
and disposed to noble actions (praktikoi ton kalon)15. This institutes a direct 
correspondence between the polis and the possibilities for the agent of practicing16 
the human end, which is the eudaimonia17. The programmatic declaration of 
intent recurs not only at the beginning of the logoi18, in Book I and II, but also at 
the end, in Book X.In this sense, the Aristotelian logoi create circularity, where 
the end of the course confirms the beginning. What matters is that in these 
passages Aristotle explains why virtuous attitude can grow only at the political 
level and introduce the problem of how the polis generates this metabolization. Let 
us try to summarize the Aristotelian argumentation, with references to the afore-
mentioned books: 
 
(1) The objective of  practical philosophy is the highest good, the human 
flourishing, which is defined as a virtuous activity19. This definition shifts the 
problem from the highest good to the assimilation of  virtues; 
                                                          
15 Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1099 b 30 – 31. 
16 The purpose of  these logoi is as well the action: “since the end of  such discussions is not 
knowledge but action”, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1095 a 5- 6. 
17 “ Accanto dunque alla concezione della polis come territorio abitato da comunità di liberi 
cittadini, la polis assumeva nel mondo greco anche il ruolo di comunità civica, la quale offriva, 
essa sola, al cittadino la possibilità di vivere bene e di esprimere e realizzare compiutamente se 
stesso, ed è in quest’ultima accezione del termine che la polis viene considerata da Aristotele” 
Salis R. in La polis tra filosofia e storia nel primo libro della Politica di Aristotele, p. 122, in 
Aristotele e la storia, edited by Rossitto C., Coppola A. and Biasutti F., Cleup, Padova, 2013. 
18 For an analysis of  the function of  the Aristotelian logoi, see Bodéüs R., Le philosophe et la cité. 
Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensée d’Aristote, Paris, Les Belles 
Lettres, 1982. 
19 “Then the good for a man turns out to be an activity of  the soul according to virtue, and if  
the virtues are many, then according to the best and most complete virtue” The Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book I, 1098 a 16 – 18. 
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(2) the virtue is a habit (hexis) and it is acquired by acting in a virtuous 
way20, so it is crucial to acquire the right habit as soon as possible21. This is the 
scope of  the polis; 
(3) the polis promotes the virtuous habits with the good forms of  
government, constitutions and the coercive force of  laws22. In order to do that, the 
politician has to study the human soul , because by ‘human virtue’ we mean not 
that of  the body but that of  the soul, for it is of  the soul , too, that happiness is 
stated by us to be an activity. If  such be the case, it is clear that a statesman 
should understand in some way the attributes of  the soul23. 
 
The importance assigned by Aristotle to the polis and to its legislative process, 
connected with the educational purpose, is exemplified by the rôle éminemment 
éducatif qui la fin de l’Ethique à Nicomaque fait jouer à la loi politique instituée par 
le nomothète24. Indeed, as R. Bodéüs demonstrated25, Nicomachean Ethics is a 
                                                          
20 Ivi, Book II, 1105 b 20 ff., paragraph IV. Here Aristotle qualifies virtue as a hexis and shows 
the difference between habits, powers and feelings.  
21 Ivi, Book II, “For it is by making citizens acquire certain habits that legislators make them 
good, and this is what every legislator wishes, but legislators who do not do this well are making 
a mistake; and good government differs from bad government in this respect. Again, it is from 
the same actions and because of  the same actions that every virtue comes into being or is 
destroyed, and similarly with every art (…) In short, it is by similar activities that habits are 
developed in men; and in view of  this, the activities in which med are engaged should be of  [the 
right] quality, for the kinds of  habits which develop follow the corresponding differences in 
those activities. So in acquiring a habit it makes no small difference whether we are acting in 
one way or in the contrary way right form our early youth; it makes a great difference, or rather 
all the difference” 1103 b 3 ff. 
22 Ivi, Book II, “For it is by making citizens acquire certain habits that legislators make them 
good, and this is what every legislator wishes, but legislators who do not do this well are making 
a mistake; and good government differs from bad government in this respect. Again, it is from 
the same actions and because of  the same actions that every virtue comes into being or is 
destroyed, and similarly with every art (…) In short, it is by similar activities that habits are 
developed in men; and in view of  this, the activities in which med are engaged should be of  [the 
right] quality, for the kinds of  habits which develop follow the corresponding differences in 
those activities. So in acquiring a habit it makes no small difference whether we are acting in 
one way or in the contrary way right form our early youth; it makes a great difference, or rather 
all the difference” 1103 b 3 ff. 
23 Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1102 a 9 ff.  
24 Rodrigo P., Aristote et les choses humaines, avec une appendice sur la politique stoïcienne, préface 
Aubenque P., Ousia, Bruxelles, 1998, p. 37. The last lines of  the Nicomachean Ethics completely 
support this interpretation and directly open to the Politics: “since our predecessors left the 
subject of  lawging without scrutiny, perhaps it is better if  we make a greater effort to examine 
it, and especially the subject concerning constitution in general, so that we may complete as 
best as we can the philosophy concerning human affairs. First, then, let us try to go over those 
parts which have been stated well by our predecessors, then form the constitutions we have 
collected let us investigate what kinds of  things tend to preserve or destroy the states or each of  
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course whose conceived audience is mainly made by scholars and politicians, 
namely the nomothetês. Thus, the emphasis Aristotle puts on these figures and on 
their particular functions allows us to distinguish two specific correlated aims of 
the Nicomachean Ethics: the political purpose, or the education of the educators26, 
and the spiritual one, or the transformation of the self.  
Now, after having summarized the Aristotelian argument, we should attempt 
to grasp more precisely how this metabolization happens. Even though we said 
that the political education is the preferential channel in order to acquire virtues, 
we did not specify how it works, while Aristotle reconstructs this passage. The 
philosopher’s account is that we acquire habits mainly thanks to an emotional 
education. This implies that above all in the earlier stages27 the good man’s 
development seems to devalue the cognitive and rational dimension and to appeal 
mainly to the emotional one. As a consequence, this draws the attention to the 
role of emotions (or passions, which both translate the Greek word pathos) in the 
habituation process and to the problem of being properly affected. Aristotle’s 
claim is that:  
 
Thus ethical virtue is concerned with pleasure and pains: for we do what is bad 
for the sake pleasure, and we abstain from doing what is noble because of the 
pain. In view of this, we should be brought up from our early youth in such a 
way as to enjoy and be pained by the things we should, as Plato says, for this 
is the right education. Again, since virtues are concerned with actions and 
passions, and since every action and every passion is accompanied by pleasure 
or pain, then for this reason, too, virtues would be concerned with pleasures 
and pains. (…) We assume, then, that such virtue is concerned with pleasures 
and pains and disposes us to do what is best, while vice disposes us to do the 
contrary.28 
 
 But what is the connection between virtues/vices, desire, passions and 
pleasure/pain? In fact, what actually characterizes and qualifies the Aristotelian 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the forms of  government and why some states are well while others are badly administered; for, 
after having investigated these matters, perhaps we would also be in a better position to 
perceive what form of  government should be ordered, and what laws and customs each should 
use. So let us start to discuss these”, 1181 b 13 ff.  
25 See Bodéüs R., Le philosophe et la cité. Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans 
la pensée d’Aristote. 
26 Expression borrowed from Bien G., La filosofia politica di Aristotele, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000. 
27 About the earlier stages of  education, it is paradigmatic the study of  Burnyeat M. F.in 
Aristotle on Learning to Be Good, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, pp. 69-92. “A wide range of  
desires and feelings are shaping patterns of  motivation and response in a person well before he 
comes to a reasoned outlook on his life as a whole, and certainly before he integrates the 
reflective consciousness with his actual behavior”, p. 70.  
28 Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1104 b ff.  
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account is the effort made to give reason of this dynamic rigorously and to justify 
it coherently with the other parts of his work. So, first, I will briefly demonstrate 
the connection between virtues/vices, passions and pleasure/pain, omitting for the 
moment how desire takes part in this process. From this point of view, we know 
that in the Aristotelian theory virtue is a hexis (habit or disposition). We also 
know that the philosopher describes habits as those qualities in virtue of which we 
are well or badly disposed with reference to the corresponding feelings29. Thanks to this 
definition it is possible to connect and, at the same time, maintain distinct virtues 
and feelings. Moreover, this leads us to shift the focus from virtue to feelings (or 
passions), identified as whatever is accompanied by pleasure or pain30. So, if the polis 
wants to promote an effective educational aim, it has to recognize pleasure and 
pain as the load-bearing axes in the early habituation stage.  
 However, we are still missing the conjunction among feelings and behavior, 
which I will now elucidate thanks to the concept of desire. For this reason, in 
order to completely understand this dynamic we have to also include Aristotelian 
psychology, especially the passage exposed in De Anima, Book III, chapter 7. 
Here the philosopher institutes a correspondence between feelings (or better, 
pleasure and pain) and desire (orexis)31. The sensitive faculty and the appetitive 
one entail each other, since when we feel pleasure we pursue and when we feel pain 
we avoid. So, though the sensitive function and the appetitive one are logically 
and physically different, they strictly cooperate together.  
This rapid reconstruction of the intersections between all these concepts says 
something more about the Aristotelian action theory32, especially about the role of 
desire. As Aristotle asserts,appetency (orexis) is the major cause of locomotion: 
 
Both these, then, are causes of locomotion, intelligence and appetency. By 
intelligence we mean that which calculates the mean to an end, that is, the 
practical intellect, which differs from the speculative intellect by the end at 
which it aims. Appetency, too, is directed to some end in every case: for that 
which is the end of desire is the starting point of the practical intellect, and the 
last stage in this process of thought is the starting point of action. Hence there 
is good reason for the view that these two are the causes of motion, appetency 
and practical thought. For it is the object of appetency, which causes motion; 
and the reason why, thought causes motion is that the object of appetency is 
the starting point of thought. (…) But, as a matter of fact, intellect is not 
                                                          
29 Ivi, Book II, 1105 b 27-28. 
30 Ivi, Book II, 1105 b 23. 
31 De Anima, edited by Hicks R. D., Cambridge University Press, 1990, Book III, 7, 431 a 8 ff.  
32 Because of  the lack of  space it will not be possible here to analyze the criterions of  
responsibility (or better, the voluntary actions/virtues), that is one of  the more important 
contributions of  the Aristotelian action theory. However, as is known, the text reference is Book 
III, Nicomachean Ethics. 
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found to cause motion apart from appetency. For rational wish is appetency; 
and, when anyone is moved in accordance with reason, he is also moved 
according to rational wish. But appetency may move a man in opposition to 
reason, for concupiscence is a species of appetency.33 
 
 As this quotation underlines, appetency has a greater influence than practical 
thought. Consequently if desire is the cause of actions (praxeis), it is as well the 
cause of virtues, because of the connection existing between actions and virtue. To 
cast some light on this circularity, we acquire virtues through the reiteration of 
actions, and the acquired virtue guarantees some stability to the agent’s behavior 
and some reliability to his character (that is to say, to his future actions). 
Nonetheless, we should make two considerations about the habituation 
process: (1) the rediscovery of the role of desire as a revolution, not as a tyranny 
and (2) the “natural” boundaries of the induced virtue. Focusing on these two 
considerations is also the turning point from the first part to the second part of 
the section dedicated to Aristotelian practical philosophy.  
 First, because of the extraordinary attention directed to the key role of 
appetency in action we could talk of a desire revolution. In contrast with an 
intellectualistic prejudice, Aristotle valorizes the primacy of desire over practical 
reason. A further evidence of this inversion of importance between practical 
reason and desire is the case of akrasia, known also as the Medea principle34. 
Indeed, the incontinence is described as a conflict engaging what we know we 
should do (which means the cognitive perception of a specific situation) and what 
we would like to do (which means the influence of passions in that context) 
resolved by the priority of desire35. In contrast to Plato’s account36, Aristotle 
conceives the hiatus between reason and desire as plausible and believes that the 
strength of the first is not sufficient to assert itself. The reason is that even if the 
intellect issues the order and the understanding bids us avoid or pursue something, still 
we are not thereby moved to act: on the contrary, action is determined by desire; in the 
case, for instance, of the incontinent man.37 In a hypothetical scale showing the 
weight of the action components, the emotional side would clearly turn out to be 
                                                          
33 De Anima, III, 10, 433 a 13 ff.  
34 Definition given by Davidson D. in Paradoxes of  irrationality, in Philosophical essays on Freud, 
Cambridge Editions Wollheim D. R. et Hopkins J., 1982, p. 294. 
35 This characterization of  akrasia corresponds to the strict incontinent action, described by Mele 
A. R. in Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, self-deception and self-control, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1987. The strict incontinent action is defined as an “incontinent action 
against a consciously held better judgment about something to be done here and now”, p.7. 
According to Mele, this is the typical kind of  incontinence studied and its features are that it 
is free and intentional.  
36 The reference is to the Platonic writing, Protagoras, and, in particular, to the passages 351 a – 
358 d. 
37 De Anima, Book III, 433 a.  
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predominant. However, it may be objected that the question concerning the 
action and the hierarchy between the rational sphere and the emotional one is 
actually far more complicated than that claimed by the “desire revolution”. The 
main risk is that the deconstruction and the invalidation of a picture of human 
nature based on a rational prejudice gives room to a new tyranny, one of feelings 
and desire. The phenomenon of weakness of willing always testifies the danger 
involved in this perspective, since it shows the consequences of being guided by 
appetency in contrast with reason or, generally speaking, the danger of a conflict 
between the plural components of actions. Indeed, when the akratic man is faced 
with a choice between two chains of actions, he experiences an internal conflict 
caused by these different tensions, and because of the lack of harmony he can not 
behave virtuously. But this remark leads us to the analysis of the practical 
reasons.  
 
b. The double meaning of  practical reason: from individual ethos to the collective 
one 
   
Therefore, the importance given to the akratic phenomenon is a proof of the 
Aristotelian awareness of the risks hidden behind this revolution. Consequently, 
the hypothesis is that in practical philosophy we can talk of a morally virtuous 
action only in presence of the conjunction between intellect and desire. In absence 
of a reevaluation of the role of intellect, virtue would be an exclusive prerogative 
of desire and Aristotle could be assimilated to Hume and the emotivists38. For this 
reason, it is possible to read many passages from Nicomachean Ethics to try to 
throw light on the dangers of this new form of extremism and to mitigate it. In 
particular, Aristotle makes some interesting remarks about the necessity of 
harmonizing the distance between reason and desire when he introduces the 
crucial problem of the principle of action, decision (proairesis) in central Book VI. 
On this occasion, Aristotle affirms that: 
 
now virtue of character is a state that decides; and decision is a 
deliberative desire. If, then, the decision is excellent, the reason must be true 
and the desire correct, so that what reason asserts is that desire pursues. (…) 
But the function of what thinks about action is truth agreeing with correct 
desire.39 
 
                                                          
38 As Sorabji R. says in Aristotle and the Role of  Intellect in Virtue, in Essay’s on Aristotle’s 
Ethics, p. 209. 
39 Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Introduction, Notes and Glossary by Irwin T., Hackett 
Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, Book VI, 1139 a 22 – 26. In this case, I have preferred 
Irwin’s edition because of  the translation of  proairesis with decision. 
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This definition ties the acquisition and the practice of virtue to the agreement 
and the proportion between reason and desire: what reason asserts is that desire 
pursues. But Aristotle goes further. Not only is decision the source of motion and 
the above-outlined dyad the source of choice, but also decision is either 
understanding combined with desire or desire combined with thought, and this is the 
sort of principle that a human being is40. As a result, the necessity of an agreement is 
directly required by the human composite soul and all the other states are above 
or below the human condition. Concerning the conditions beyond the truly human 
one, the beginning of Book VII is paradigmatic, since it offers a complete 
overview of the human possibilities41. Indeed, here Aristotle talks about six kinds 
of states. If we exclude virtues and vices, which are both a hexis requiring the 
explained agreement, four different states are left. Our attention is drawn to two 
of them, brutality and the divine or heroic virtue42, because they represent the 
negative and the positive extremes. Otherwise stated, brutality and the divine 
virtue identify the possible developmental directions beyond ta anthropina, the 
human affairs. On the other hand, the remaining two are the already-seen akrasia, 
incontinence, and its opposite, continence. Whereas the first couple synthesizes 
the extreme options, the last one embodies the condition of oi polloi, the many. In 
fact, Aristotle states that the virtuous man is one who has harmonious thoughts, 
who desires the same things with respect to every part of the soul43, while the majority 
of men are in conflict with themselves, as the incontinent case proves44. So, not 
only is Aristotle well aware of the complexity of the agreement between reason 
and desire, but he is also conscious that the virtuous condition concretely concerns 
only a minority in the polis.  
 The intrinsic difficulty of acting virtuously legitimates the controversial 
characterization of semi-utopian. On the one hand, it is a form of utopia, because it 
requires the correct education and the correct complete moral development; in 
this sense, only a few people can actually promote this kind of care of self. On the 
other hand, it is semi-utopian since Aristotle still leaves room for the perfectionism 
of the self, both in political and philosophical dimensions. In fact, the recognition 
of an unattained higher condition and the consequent work on oneself to realize it 
(or, at least, to get close) are the warranty of a continuous improvement towards 
the moral development. Thus, the self-realization is a concrete possibility, even 
though extremely difficult. Moreover, if until now the doubts affected mostly the 
                                                          
40 Ivi, 1139 b 4 – 6. 
41 Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, 
Book VII, 1045 a 15 – 24. 
42 If  we want to clearly identify divine life or virtue, we should think of  Book X of  
Nicomachean Ethics, chapter VI – VIII, where Aristotle introduces the bios theoretikos and the 
human tension toward divine life. 
43 Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, 1166 a 14 – 15. 
44 Ivi, 1166 b 7 – 8. 
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agent and the practicability of the virtuous attitude, because of the complexity of 
intertwined elements, it is important to note that the doubts also touch the 
correlated concept, the polis. As a matter of fact, Aristotle is well aware that there 
could be polis whose constitutions (politeia) do not incentivize the moral 
development, or, what is worse, they concretely do not allow it. From this point of 
view, the Aristotelian account rather than being descriptive of a concrete 
condition, it is indicative of a tension towards the realization of the intrinsically 
connected aims, as well as the political and the individual. In this sense, 
Aristotelian practical philosophy is not naively optimistic or anchored in an irenic 
imagination of reality. But the confutation of a simplified interpretation of 
practical philosophy could be clarified through a deeper analysis of the concept of 
practical intellect and of its role.  
 The renewed importance of reason clearly unveils itself if we consider the 
formalization of the chain of reasoning, the practical syllogism45. First of all, in 
order to best capitalize this tool, we should briefly recall the structure of a 
practical syllogism, that could be schematized like that: 
 
MaPX-Y 
MiP Z-X 
Con Z-Y46  
 
Moreover, an example will make this schema more intelligible: 
 
MaP: To not get wet when it rains (X) it is important to be in good health (Y); 
MiP: To carry an umbrella (Z) is a way not to get wet when it rains (X); 
Con: You should carry an umbrella when it rains (Z) to be in good health (Y). 
 
What is relevant in our analysis is the exam of the different functions played 
by each concept andtheir interactions with each other. Concerning the major term 
(Y), thanks to the analysis in Eudemian Ethics, we know that no one decides on an 
end, but rather on what contributes to the end (…) for example no one decides to be 
healthy (…) nor to be happy47. So, according to Aristotle, the goal is not the result 
                                                          
45 A careful examination of  Aristotle’s concept of  practical syllogism is offered by Natali C., La 
saggezza di Aristotele, Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1989, especially chapter IV. 
46 Where MaP identifies the major premise, MiP indicates minor premise and Con identifies the 
conclusion, the syllogism’s outcome, that is an action. Moreover, we have to distinguish: 
a) The major term (Y), which indicates the end (telos) that in the practical syllogism is ton 
agathon/eudaimonia; 
b) the minor term (Z), which is the efficient cause whose end is the major term; 
c) the middle term (X), which is a specification of  the general goal relative to a particular 
kairos and connects the other two terms.  
47 Eudemian Ethics, Book II, 1226 a 6 – 10. 
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of reasoning or choice. But the philosopher goes further and shows that the end of 
the MaP is composed by the couple of opinion (doxa) and desire (orexis)48, which 
means the recognition of a good habit linked to the above-seen dynamic of 
pleasure and pain. Thus, the end of the practical syllogism is the result of 
metabolization and ethismos49, as induced virtue explained. However, because of its 
indeterminacy the MaP is inactive (e.g. human flourishing and to be in good 
health are still abstract concepts). Due to this passiveness and inactivity, the 
middle term (not to get wet) plays a key role in concretely re-determining the end (to 
be in good health) in the particular situation (when it rains) and, by doing that, in 
connecting the MaP with the conclusion. But this passage is still not enough, since 
we are missing what the agent actually does in order to realize the specification of 
the general end. And that is where the minor term (to carry an umbrella) 
intervenes. As it emerges from the scheme, the minor term is actually the course of 
action deliberated for achieving the general goal, after having specified it. 
However, the cooperation between middle and minor term is still unclear. That is 
why we have to focus on the MiP, since it is the place where they are joint 
together. Again, it is only through the balance of reason and desire that the agent 
can make choices, since the decision is a deliberational desire for things that depend 
on us50 (in fact, e.g. the weather does not depend on us). The latter implies the 
transmission of desire, conveyed from Y to X, the specification of the general 
agathon, and the role of practical wisdom, which allows us to identify the best 
action model. Finally, we arrive at the study of the concept of practical reason, 
phronesis, the function of which has always engaged Aristotelian scholars51. They 
are mainly polarized into two perspectives: one that considers phronesis as the 
search (zetesis) for the ways to reach the goal, whereas the other one sees phronesis 
as directly involved with the definition of the goal52. However, E. Berti has 
offered a different interpretation, which goes beyond the polarization described 
above. According to Berti we should read practical wisdom as being differently 
involved in both. As a matter of fact, phronesis firstly has to recognize the goal53, 
                                                          
48 Ivi, Book II, paragraph X. 
49 In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle directly recognizes the polis as the responsible of  this 
habituation: “hence the good itself  would be this: the goal of  all that is achievable by human 
action. This is what falls under the science that has authority over all sciences; this science is 
politics and household management and wisdom”, Book I, 1218 b 13 ff. By ethismos we mean the 
process of  social transmission of  behavioral patterns, through rewards and punishments, as Natali 
defined it in La saggezza di Aristotele, p. 163. 
50 Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, 1113 a 12. 
51 In fact, Bodéüs has coined the expression l’irritante querelle des exégèts to talk about the 
debate that has gone through the XX century about the role of  phronesis in practical 
philosophy.  
52 The two interpretative lines respectively are well represented by Aubenque P. and Gauthier R. 
53 Berti E., Nuovi studi aristotelici vol. III, Filosofia pratica, Morcelliana, Brescia, 2008, chapter 
3, Phronesis et science politique, pp. 39 – 59, paragraph 2, La phronesis et son objet, pp. 47–51. 
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and only after the acknowledgement of ton agathon (which is the result of the 
habituation process) is it possible for one to decide on how to achieve it. Thus, this 
necessary recognition is what distinguishes phronesis from cleverness (deinotes)54, 
that is conceived as a form of instrumental reason that calculates the ways to 
achieve any goal (no matter if right or wrong). In this sense, even though practical 
wisdom does not deliberate about the telos55 nor does it call it into question, its 
function is not simply the choice of the best chain of actions addressed to any end. 
Its fundamental premise is ton agathon, the good end (to recall the previous 
example, the first step is the acknowledgement of health (Y) as a good to be 
pursued). 
These initial considerations about phronesis lead us to the second point, called 
the “natural” boundaries of the induced virtue. Indeed, it is important to remind 
ourselves that the induced virtue defines an “embryonic moment” that should be 
overcome. If it is true that political education is fundamental, since it represents 
the first stage in moral development, it is also true that habituation is not 
sufficient to make men virtuous, when this also implies autonomy, in the sense of 
being able to self-exercise practical reason. In other words, two elements work in 
synergy for eupraxia: intellect and character56. If character at the beginning is the 
outcome of the induced virtue and of the polis’ work, intellect, on the other hand, is 
always particular and requires the active contribution of the agent. And that is 
exactly the role of phronesis, since it is the intellectual virtue letting the agent 
deliberate about the possible course of actions.  
But, allow me to make some remarks about phronesis and its personification, 
the phronimos. We could start from the incarnation of practical reason. The 
phronimos is an agent who shares the common opinion of the highest good, thanks 
to habituation, and who knows how to achieve it in the situation, thanks to the 
exercise of phronesis. The constant combination of these two features makes the 
phronimos a behavioral model, since the measure of each thing is virtue or a good 
man as such57. But this figure is problematic. Or better, it is, as we remarked for 
the aims of Aristotelian practical philosophy, a semi-utopia. In this case, its main 
problem is the unity of virtue: as J. Annas said, if we acquired a hexis, we should 
                                                          
54 Nicomachean Ethics, Book, VI, 1144 a 24 -29.  
55 And it would not be possible, since we cannot deliberate about things that could not be 
otherwise, as Aristotle states in Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 1141 b 8 ff. : “prudence, on the 
other hand, is concerned with things which are human and objects of  deliberation; for we 
maintain that the function of  a prudent man is especially this, to deliberate well, and no one 
deliberates about invariable things or about things not having an end which is a good attainable 
by action”. 
56 Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 1139 a 31 – 1139 b 6. 
57 Ivi, Book X, 1176 a 16 – 17. The distance between the virtuous man, the excellent, and oi 
polloi is stated in Book III, 1113 a 25 – 1113 b 2. 
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be able to acquire all, since the link is the exercise of phronesis58. Thus, according 
to Annas’ analysis, the complete wise-man, in possession of all the virtues, is a 
normative ideal, while we could talk of the concrete phronimos as a continuous 
“approximation”, getting closer and closer to the ideal paradigm. 
The second consideration directly aims at the characteristics of practical 
intellect. We could explain it by introducing two metaphorical pictures, often used 
among Aristotelian scholars in order to better represent the moral developmental 
dynamic: the athlete and the student59.In both cases, there is a fundamental 
initial training, where the athlete and the student are taught the skills that they 
will be able to practice, and then a moment of autonomous application. For 
instance, when you learn to play the piano, first you have to learn the 
fundamentals and the technique. Only at a later date you will be able to play 
more difficult compositions or to extemporize. In this case, assimilation goes 
through the repetition and recognition of the developed skills. That is why you 
will be able to use it and you will be persuaded of their goodness. The combination 
of repetition and recognition moreover generates a form of automatism, which 
allows the definition of virtues, and more generally of character, as “second 
nature”. To understand this statement, the example of the athlete is perfect: as a 
matter of fact, the spontaneous and graceful movement made by athletes looks 
natural, and one could almost think that no effort is required. So, the result of the 
training is that the athlete or the student does not have to concentrate on what to 
do or how to do it all the time, thanks to the long repetition of the movement and 
to the acknowledgement of its reasons. As a consequence, the metabolization 
makes the thought and the resulting action immediate and natural. But the 
automatism, induced by lifelong repetition, generates the action naturally, so only 
a new metabolization can modify it. The concept of second nature should be now 
clearer: a developed character which is spontaneous and intuitive, but not 
impulsive. If we think of the practical syllogism, it means that the cardinal 
passage of the transmission of desire and of the practice of phronesis (MiP) 
becomes an automatism. 
All these remarks about the chain of practical reasoning and the role of 
phronesis provoke two related questions: 
 
1) How many chains of  actions does phronesis really consider and practice? 
                                                          
58 Annas J, The morality of  happiness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. 
59 See Annas J., The intelligent virtue, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. Moreover, it has to 
be recognized that one of  these figures is primarily Aristotelian, since the philosopher talks 
about the athlete in order to explain the existing connection between activities and character in 
Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, 1114 a: “for it is particular activities which produce men of  a 
certain kind. This is clear in the case of  those who train themselves for any contest or action; for 
they are constantly active”. In addition, the student, as it has been said at the beginning, is the 
ideal audience of  these logoi. 
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Does it really leave room for different chains of  actions or do we follow some 
already fixed behavioral patterns? 
2) Does Aristotle imagine any form of  criticism of  the politically accepted 
end? If  yes, what is it and how does it work, since we know that by the end 
practical wisdom, although concerned,does not deliberate upon it? 
 
The first question could be posed in two different ways: on the one hand it 
concerns the reliability of character, on the other hand it implies a form of 
character determinism. The two interpretations differ from the weight of the 
automatism seen above. While the first reads the mechanism as an assurance of 
character stability, the second one interprets it like a “prison of the 
character”60.The supporters of the first interpretation, like Annas and Burnyeat61, 
affirm that character positively conditions future actions, since ethos is a 
compound of virtues, being stable habits acquired through repetition. That is the 
previously announced circularity between hexeis and praxeis. The problem is to 
understand whether training and metabolization can enrich our possibilities or if 
they produce some standardized and predictable patterns. In other words, what is 
at stake is the chance of acting differently from how we are supposed to do 
according to our ethos. Otherwise, there is a risk one might fall into what has been 
called the “prison of character”, since the habit would become too strong and 
inevitably influence praxeis. This problem has been perfectly analyzed by P. 
Donini, who states that 
 
il possesso di un carattere formato, qualificato da abiti stabili, consente 
dunque a un agente di rispondere correttamente nel modo richiesto dalla 
situazioni che gli si presentano, anche senza calcolare e deliberare intorno ad 
ogni parola e a ogni azione: ma gli abiti e il carattere comportano una sorta di 
automatismo nelle risposte anche in un altro senso: escludono, cioè, di per sé la 
possibilità di dar corsa a un’intera serie di azioni.62  
 
This concern for character crystallization finds some coherent remarks in the 
Aristotelian text, especially when Aristotle recognizes that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to change an ethos once it has been acquired. The main reference is the 
debate about the alcoholic, who could have avoided drunkenness but did not, or 
                                                          
60 Donini P., Ethos, Aristotele e il determinismo, Edizioni dell’Orso, Torino, 1989. 
61 Annas J., The morality of  happiness, and Burnyeat M. F., Aristotle on learning to be good in 
Essays on Aristotle’s ethics, pp. 69-72. 
62 Donini P., Ethos, Aristotele e il determinismo, p.79 and Abitudine e saggezza. Aristotele dall’Etica 
Eudemia all’Etica Nicomachea, chapter IV, Unidirezionalità degli abiti e posizione del fine, pp. 
91–137.  
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the one, who became ill because of his way of life63. In both cases, their activities 
produced the stable negative state and the consequence is that a sick person will 
not become healthy by merely wishing to become healthy64. Again in Book V, Aristotle 
states that a habit does not leave room for opposite actions due to its tendency, 
such as from healthy only healthy things are done and not both contraries65. However, 
it is true that Aristotle contemplates also the reversibility of ethos when he talks of 
friendship, or better when he faces equally the corruption and the improvement of 
a virtuous character. In both cases, the shared question is if the character 
involution66 or the superiority in virtue67 justifies or not the rupture of friendship. 
As it is evident, the problem generated by character automatism cannot be 
determined easily and Aristotle offers no decisive help in answering this question. 
Anyhow, it is needless to say: in all the considered situations representing cases of 
practical wisdom, the general end is never discussed. For instance, who can bring 
the choice of playing the piano or of learning a language into question and how? 
According to Aristotle’s account, the same student cannot do that for two reasons. 
First, he is persuaded of its activity, which means that he has absorbed the right 
motivations68. Second, the practical reason, as it has been described till now, does 
not consider such a possibility. Although simplified, this example directly leads to 
the second point, namely the eventual critic of the telos, the goal. We could now 
explain this problem by going back to the formal presentation of the practical 
syllogism. In the MaP, we saw that the highest good is never actually brought 
into question and it is the outcome of orexis plus doxa. As already remarked, it is 
accepted due to the habituation process and practical reason (MiP) is active in all 
its concrete specifications, in the kairos (given by the middle term). For this 
reason, phronesis is fully immanent or, in other words, never separated from the 
shared telos. Like that, all solutions and courses of action are always within the 
possibilities offered by the collective ethos. This sort of finalistic dogmatism could 
be highly dangerous, in particular because it inhibits any form of criticism. The 
intrinsically negative potentialities of an immanent practical reason becomes clear 
if we consider some paroxysmal examples: just imagine living in a context or form 
                                                          
63 Both the examples come from Nicomachean Ethics Book III, in the discussion about 
ignorance and responsible actions. 
64 Ivi, Book III, 1114 a 15 -16. 
65 Ivi, Book V, 1129 a 15. 
66 Ivi, Book IX, 1165 a 13 – 14: “again, if  one accepts another ad a friend, taking him as a good 
man, but the latter turns out to be evil and is regarded to be such, should he still be kept as a 
friend?” 
67 Ibidem, 1165 b 23 - 25: “but if  one friend were to remain the same while the other were to 
become better and far superior in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend, or should 
not?” 
68 If  you talk to an athlete or to a student of  music or in general to someone who has for long 
time practiced an activity, he would certainly be able to give you many good reasons for doing 
that action, such as, for instance, it is healthy or it makes you feel good. 
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of life where wealth or physical wellness respectively are considered the highest 
good and everything (such as the educational system or the welfare state) always 
tends to it. In both cases, the simple exercise of phronesis does not provide any 
kind of instruments to discuss those ends, and the phronimos would be the agent 
able of better performing them.  
This is potentially the aporetic climax of practical philosophy. And exactly 
here politike episteme intervenes, with its task of contesting and determining the 
telos69. In fact, this form of rationality aims at discussing the shared ends and at 
testing their contradictions through the dialectical method. To better understand 
how practical philosophy works, the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics is 
paradigmatic, where Aristotle discusses the different conceptions of eudaimonia 
and he shows the incongruity of the ways of life based only on pleasure, wealth 
and honor (edone, ploutos and time)70 with respect to the human soul. In fact, the 
concepts of the human psyche and its excellence, perfection71 are the basis of the 
confutation of these common opinions. Again, another opportunity to witness 
how politike episteme works are Books VIII and X, where Aristotle talks of 
friendship (philia). Also in this case, the philosopher proceeds dialectally and 
demonstrates that the central type of philia rather than being based on pleasure 
(dia to edu) and advantage (are dia ton chresimon) is dia ten areten72 (according to 
virtue, so to character).  
Moreover, thanks to these examples it is also possible to verify how far 
Aristotelian practical philosophy differs from the common sense. Indeed, on the 
one side, the recognition of bios theoretikos73 as the highest and most preferable 
way of life does not match the sensibility of the polis, that demands the political 
involvement typical of the bios praktikos74. On the other side, although we have 
seen how uncommon moral excellence is, the perfect form of friendship is 
characterized by being the one among good men, who have developed the virtuous 
ethos. In both cases, politike episteme radically puts common sense into question 
and proposes alternative ways. These do not exclude shared opinions (such as 
                                                          
69 One of  the clearest studies about the different meanings of  the practical reason is the already 
quoted work of  Berti E. Nuovi studi aristotelici vol. III, Filosofia pratica; especially chapters II, 
Ragione pratica e normatività in Aristotele, p.25-38 and chapter III, Phronesis et science politique, 
pp. 39-59. 
70 Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, chapter 2. 
71 Which in the Aristotelian vocabulary means the skill of  accomplishing its most important 
part. In the case of  the human soul, the highest function is the rational one, or better the bios 
theoretikos. 
72 The definition of  the highest kind of  friendship is in Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII. 
73 Ivi, Book I and Book X. 
74 Which is, after all, the proper human way of  life, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X. However, the 
conciliation of  the practical and contemplative lives is one of  the biggest issue of  the 
Nicomachean Ethics, played between an inclusive or exclusive interpretation. 
IRENE DAL POZ 
 
274 
 
pleasure, honor and wealth, or pleasure and advantage), but reallocate their 
importance in a wider perspective. 
In the light of this, the distinction between the two co-existing plans in 
practical philosophy can be summarized by this picture: phronesis focuses on how 
to exercise skills properly, while politike episteme pays attention to the purpose on 
its whole and it is guided by the understanding ofbasic human properties. In this 
sense, the practical philosopher is a cardinal figure in Aristotelian reflection, since 
it guarantees the existence of a critical circularity between the individual ethos and 
the collective one. Whereas the phronimos and phronesis show the immanent 
practice of reason, practical philosophy demonstrates that there is a reflective and 
transcendent movement towards the polis and its constitution anyway. Again, 
while the immanence of phronesis is typically conservative, since it finds its 
categories only inside the polis, the transcendence of politike episteme assures a 
form of transformation and of dynamism. This also enlightens a new figurative 
representation of their relationship: politike episteme is the compass whose variable 
and dynamic openness delimits the space of phronesis, all statically75 contained 
within the circumference. Here all the different variations of phronesis take 
place76, while politike episteme remains external. This graphical representation also 
gives reason of another fundamental Aristotelian idea, especially if compared with 
Plato’s point of view: the distinction between the roles of the philosopher and the 
politician. The first one influences politics at the base (in terms of drawing 
boundaries by defining the goal, telos), whereas the second one practices the 
political exercise concretely. These two figures are never overlapping, as regards 
the different functions.  
The importance of politike episteme emerges also by considering the 
contemporary interpretation of the Aristotelian practical philosophy. As a matter 
of fact, one shortcoming of many scholars, especially from the analytic scenario, 
has been to underestimate the role of practical philosophy, emphasizing only one 
kind of practical reason, phronesis. As Berti has shown, this has led to a 
misunderstanding of the different plans involved in the praxis, overestimating the 
                                                          
75 In this case, statically is not negatively qualified, since it is actually the right practice of  a 
specific function. All the concepts of  dynamism, transformation and conservationism rather 
than being the expression of  values’ judgment want to be a neutral description of  functions. 
76 As a matter of  fact, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle clearly distinguishes different 
practices of  phronesis: “both politics and prudence are the same disposition, but in essence they 
are not the same. Of  prudence concerned with the stat, the one which is architectonic is 
legislative, while the other which is concerned with particulars has the common name ‘political 
prudence’; and the latter is concerned with particular actions and deliberations, for a particular 
measure voted on is like an individual thing to be acted upon. (…) Prudence is thought to be 
concerned most of  all with matters relating to the person in whom it exists and with him only; 
and this disposition has the common name ‘prudence’. Of  the other kinds, one is financial 
management, another is law-giving, and a third is political, of  which one part is deliberative and 
the other judicial”, Book VI, 1141 b 24 – 35. 
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importance of phronesis. But the consideration of only a one-dimensional practical 
wisdom, merely endogenous, has had as a consequence a flattening of the agent on 
the context and an agent’s inability to dissociate himself from the values of life 
form. This problem becomes clear if we consider two examples, coming from 
authors who are influenced by this interpretation, J. Annas and A. MacIntyre. In 
Intelligent Virtue, Annas analyzes the case of someone who grew up in a slum. 
Annas' account is that the considered context radically compromises his 
possibilities of developing and practicing virtue77. At the same time, in After 
Virtue, MacIntyre seems to connect virtues mainly to the common morality, 
moving the goal of criticizing contemporary ethics to the background. Even if it is 
true that when MacIntyre values the role of tradition he is thinking of the 
problem of individualism78, his emphasis on the community and on its values 
apparently do not consider the possibility of refusing or redirecting that tradition. 
Although in MacIntyre’s account79 the importance of the interpretative 
framework does not entail neither a relativistic conception of values and truth, 
nor an exclusive interpretation of traditions (as if they could exist closed on 
themselves), his voice is functional to emphasize one of the possible risks caused 
by the understatement of the role of politike episteme. 
This rapid account of a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian view leads us to 
the last part of this paper, whose content refers directly to contemporary 
philosophy. Here I will approach the problem of the relationship between the 
agent and the context by trying to understand if the Aristotelian answer is still 
suitable for ethical experience. 
 
 
3. The pertinence of  an inactual thought for the contemporary debate 
 
To address this final topic, I would like to start from the above-mentioned 
problem of the imbalance in the relationship between the agent and the context, 
                                                          
77 In Annas’ thought it is important to remember that she distinguishes the difference between 
not being able of  virtue and not expecting virtue here, where the first case if  an error while the 
second is reasonable. That is why “we do not expect people raised on a garbage dumps outside a 
Third World megalopolis to be kind and generous in their everyday behavior, but this, I suggest, 
for the same kind of  reason that we do not expect them to play the piano or to do the 
crossword. Their environment has obviously lacked the opportunities to learn and to do these 
things, and because this is so obvious we do not assume that they are naturally unable to do 
them”, p. 31. 
78 MacIntyre A., After Virtue, University of  Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, third 
edition, 2007: “I inherit from the past of  my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of  
debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of  my life, 
my moral starting point. (…) This thought is likely to appear alien and even surprising from the 
standpoint of  modern individualism”, p. 220. 
79 Which is surely far more complicated than this brief  reconstruction.  
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as it has come to light thanks to previous references to Annas and MacIntyre. My 
purpose is to recall this aporia and to show that, if seen through the analysis made 
in the first part, an asset has paradoxically emerged.  
As already remarked, the impasse is created by the omission of the function of 
politike episteme. Once the task of practical philosophy is properly sharpened and 
the importance of transcendence has arisen, the role played by tradition and 
community still remains fundamental, but it is attenuated and specified. In these 
terms, phronesis and politike episteme co-operate and they can guarantee a 
bidirectional circularity between individual ethos and collective one. While 
phronesis proves the efficacy of the habituation process and of the individual 
responsibility, both within the polis’ perspective, politike episteme assures the 
reflective movement upon the polis itself. At the exact point where Virtue Ethics 
seems to produce a deadlock, it is possible to rediscover the complexity of 
Aristotelian practical philosophy, the main strength of which is the ability of 
weaving together complementary tensions. As just seen, the harmony between the 
constitutive belonging to an ethical substance, or the immanence of phronesis, and 
its necessary passing, or the transcendence of politke episteme, are all perfect 
examples of this peculiarity.  
The clarification of how all the different levels in practical philosophy imply 
each other revokes the evaluative principle introduced at the beginning, that is to 
say the coordination of concepts. As explained, each concept finds its sense in the 
network built by the relationship with others. The latter, meaning that if any 
concept is abstracted from the network, it loses its sense or its efficacy. For 
instance, the misunderstanding about the role of practical reason is the result of 
the overestimation of one concept, phronesis. But, allow me to establish another 
critical example, which has already been introduced many times: the desire 
revolution. Although it represents a fascinating acquisition in comparison with 
the rational prejudice that demonizes the importance of desire in the decision-
making process, as I have tried to explain we can talk of it only by accepting the 
premises of Aristotelian ethics and psychology. Otherwise, the concept of desire is 
excluded from the context where it becomes productive and it loses its 
demonstrative strength.  
From this point of view, we cannot look for an immediately implementable 
model in Aristotelian practical philosophy. In fact, a break has occurred between 
the modern conception of praxis and the ancient one; because of it, the cardinal 
concepts and their relationship have deeply changed80. An impracticable 
actualization of the whole train of thought, which is radically different from the 
contemporary one81, would be required to try to actualize one concept (e.g. desire).  
                                                          
80 This is the strong theory exposed by Chignola S. et Duso G. in Storia dei concetti e filosofia 
politica, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2008. 
81 A paradigmatic example is also the Aristotelian category of  agent. As a matter of  fact the 
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These remarks lead to the inactuality of Aristotelian practical philosophy and 
the necessity to respect its difference. This issue occupies the final part of the 
paper, which once again calls into question the relationship between individual 
ethos and collective ethos and introduces to the last and, probably, biggest problem. 
In fact, the concluding topic refers to the existence of one context or the explosion 
of the forms of life. This issue radically challenges the structure of the essay, since 
up to now I have focused on the connection between one agent and one life form 
(namely, the polis). The pluralization of the forms of life could jeopardize the 
thesis of the dynamic circularity between the two meanings of ethos, or could have 
to modify and extend it to this new input. In fact, the eventuality of considering 
many forms of life would confirm the inactuality of Aristotelian practical 
philosophy, which is based on a one-to-one relationship (the agent and the polis), 
and the impossibility to actualize it. To pursue this itinerary, first I will briefly 
draw a picture of what I mean by the pluralization of the contexts in contrast 
with the one-to-one connection, and then I will try to sum up some conclusive 
considerations. 
First of all, at the beginning of the paper I defined the collective ethos, with all 
its meanings, as the context or the polis. In this sense, the polis has been thought 
of as a singular and coherent reality, where different parts interact with each 
other. This interpretation is suggested and confirmed also by Aristotle, when in 
Politics he talks about the relationship between the whole and the parts and the 
primacy of the whole82. As a consequence, the relationship between the individual 
ethos and the collective one is bidirectional, initially imbalanced towards the polis 
but never vicious thanks to the roles of practical reason. But what is relevant at 
this point is that Aristotle rigidly establishes both practical agent and polis. 
Indeed, Aristotle is thinking of a precise polis, Athens, in contrast with the other 
polis and the Barbarians. Moreover, the philosopher is considering a specific 
agent, the free man, in contrast with all the other excluded categories (e.g. women 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
philosopher in his logoi, and generally in his philosophy, is thinking of  specific figure: the adult 
and free man in the polis. The evident consequence is that he is leaving out from this category 
many other figures that we are used to consider in it, such as women or children. I will come 
back soon on the issue of  polis dimension. 
82 See the Politics, Second Edition, University of  Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013, Book I, 1253 a 
18 ff.: “Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the 
whole is of  necessity prior to the part; for example, if  the whole body be destroyed, there will be 
no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of  a stone hand; for 
when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their working 
and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their 
proper quality, but only that they have the same name. The proof  that the state is a creation of  
nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and 
therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who 
has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of  
a state.” 
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or slaves). As a consequence, the match between the possible combinations is all 
played inside these two specific terms and it does not consider different kinds of 
agents or forms of life.  
To schematize it, we could imagine this kind of representation Xy, where 
X stands for the context (or the whole, or the polis), y for the agent, and the 
majuscule or minuscule indicates the balance of power between them. But this 
rigid bidirectional equivalence no longer fits our ethical experience, due to one 
main reason: the expansions of the contexts, or what C. Taylor has defined as the 
“nova effect”83. With this expression the Canadian philosopher indicates the 
pluralization of perspectives and the openness of different forms of life. 
Rethinking the figurative representation seen above, it becomes clear that the two 
parts of the equivalence no longer correspond to the ethical scenario. To begin 
with the first term of the relationship (X), instead of living within one context we 
now have to face the co-existence of many different ways of life. If in Aristotelian 
Practical Philosophy was acceptable to recognize a specific collective ethos (namely, 
the polis) as the reference frame, in the contemporary ethical horizon this strict 
identification is reductive. Not only the polis is not the current political 
dimension, but it has also been "substituted" by a multiplicity of co-existing 
contexts. In this sense, the texture composed by the forms of life seems to be 
thicker and more dynamic if compared to the case of the polis. To pass from one 
graphic representation to another, the supernova effect could be drawn as a 
stratification and intersection of many contextual levels, the directions and 
intensities of which are different. 
But in this perspective, the focal point of which is the bidirectional 
relationship between the two means of ethos, the pluralization of the frames of 
reference problematizes two main questions: 
 
1. Given that the basis of virtue are political, not natural, which grid of 
intelligibilityis prevalent in the character preformation? 
2. What happens to the correlative minor term (Y) of the equivalence? That is 
to say, what changes in the way we approach the issue of the agent? 
 
Regarding the grid of intelligibility, the question could be posed in this way: in 
Aristotelian Practical Philosophy the emphasis on the context corresponds to the 
early stage of the character habituation, when virtue is induced and the agent 
educated. In this sense, if the polis was responsible for the character habituation, 
who plays this role now and how? Let us consider an example: what mainly 
                                                          
83 Taylor C., A Secular Age, Harvard University Press, 2009. In particular, the chapter The 
Nova Effect, pp. 299-419. In that case, Taylor talks of  the nova effect in the context of  the 
secularization problem. From this paper point of  view, we will use that expression to identify 
the pluralization process. 
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characterizes our self-perception and identity? The sense of belonging to our city, 
to our country, to the European Union, to a certain conception of the European 
Union or to any other structure of society? What level actually prevails on the 
others and in which case, given that each one seems to be reasonable and 
acceptable? Consequently, if the concept of the form of life is modified or 
extended, also the agent has to be put into question (not to mention that the 
concept itself of an agent enlarged from the Aristotelian free adult man). From 
this point of view, the issue of the pluralization of collective ethos (X) radically 
involves the correlative term: the agent (y). Indeed, recalling the graphic 
representation of a stratification and an intersection of different contextual levels, 
the agent seems to discover himself as a changing segment that experiences and 
crosses some of them. Moreover, the pluralization of forms of life concerns not 
only the "passive" phase (so, the character preformation), but also the "active" 
one, since all the practices of practical reason are displayed through the 
constitutive reference to these complex stratification of contexts. As a matter of 
fact, a shared and recognized pattern of virtues is the premise for phronesis, for the 
consequent recognition of the phronimos and for the critical task of politike 
episteme. 
 It is unlikely that this is the right place to analyze and discuss in greater 
detail the depth of the problem of the pluralization of forms of life, that would 
deserve an independent and much wider analysis. However, what is interesting 
here is that the current ethical scenario seems to be more complex and articulated 
than the one described by Aristotle and this density is the cause of a new impasse. 
In fact, this stalemate is produced by the change in the definitions of the terms of 
agent and context, and, as a result, of their relationship itself.  
Now let me conclude by making some remarks, that will summarize the hot-
spots of the paper and will recall the above-seen issue. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As previously stated, I would like to conclude by briefly summing up some of the 
most relevant points emerged in the paper. They are principally two: (1) the 
intimate contiguity and bidirectionality between individual ethos and collective one 
and (2) the impasse of the distance and the solution of the contingence.  
The demonstration of the first theme has occupied all the initial section and 
has been encouraged by the reconstruction of the contemporary debate. First, 
thanks to Anscombe and Slote’s analysis, a window into Virtue Ethics and its 
reasons has been given. Then, the clarified necessity of rethinking the moral agent 
has supported the examination of practical philosophy, guided by the inclusive 
concept of ethos. An itinerary through a composite complex of Aristotelian 
writings (Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, Politics and De Anima) has led to 
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the conclusion that the relationship between the two meanings of ethos is both 
circular and dynamic. These two features are guaranteed by the distinct steps of 
the moral development. From one side, we have (a) the metabolization or 
habituation process, denoted with the induced virtue. From the other side, we have 
(b) the co-existence of different levels of freedom, identified with the two practices 
of practical reason, phronesis and politike episteme. Moreover, another 
fundamental characteristic of Aristotelian practical philosophy has come to light: 
the constant balance between desire and reason. Its examination is unavoidable in 
order to fully understand the circularity just mentioned, because it gives reason of 
all the dimensions involved in the inner workings behind the above-seen 
expression.  
An intermediate remark about the inactuality of Aristotelian Practical 
Philosophy has then conducted to the last section of the essay, whose problem is 
the legitimacy of Aristotelian practical philosophy in contemporary thought. 
Thus, I tried to draw the attention to an aporetic moment, referring to the 
problem of the collective ethos and its pluralization. From this point of view, the 
distance and the inactuality of Aristotelian reflection are at the same time an 
advantage and a limit. But this is precisely this issue I would like to recall here. 
Indeed, I would like to point out that one of the main contributions of this 
analysis is having demonstrated that next to the importance of the distance there 
is always the need for the contingence and for the specificity of the situation. In 
this sense, ancient philosophy does not directly provide an abstract and fixed 
model to be put into practice, since the same practice would contradict it. After 
all, the immanence of the praxis is one of the main Aristotelian lessons, as it is 
proved by his care for endoxa (shared opinions) in the dialectical method and for 
the role of phronesis in the decision-making process. Thus, if the rediscovery of 
Aristotelian practical philosophy wants to be included in the contemporary 
ethical horizon, it must always be accompanied by an immanent point of view, 
that has to take the peculiarities of each specific context and historical situation 
into consideration.  
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